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Abstract
Eﬀorts to combat and prevent transnational terrorism rely, to a great extent, on the eﬀective allocation of security
resources. Critical to the success of this allocation process is the identiﬁcation of the likely geopolitical sources and
targets of terrorism. We construct the network of transnational terrorist attacks, in which source (sender) and target
(receiver) countries share a directed edge, and we evaluate a network analytic approach to forecasting the
geopolitical sources and targets of terrorism. We integrate a deterministic, similarity-based, link prediction framework
into a probabilistic modeling approach in order to develop an edge-forecasting method. Using a database of over
12,000 transnational terrorist attacks occurring between 1968 and 2002, we show that probabilistic link prediction is
not only capable of accurate forecasting during a terrorist campaign, but is a promising approach to forecasting the
onset of terrorist hostilities between a source and a target.
Introduction
The accurate forecasting of transnational terrorism is
among themost pressing problems of contemporary secu-
rity policy. Counter-terrorism eﬀorts may be greatly aided
if resources, ranging from analytic focus to prevention
capabilities, can eﬀectively target the source of terrorist
threats before terrorists can launch attacks. Traditional
eﬀorts to statistically forecast terrorism are complicated
by the fact that most forecasting models perform best
when there is a long series of data to study, thus ren-
dering them impotent for identifying new sources of
threat and forecasting attacks from sources that have not
attacked before. For example, a protracted terrorist cam-
paign may provide enough data for accurate time-series
forecasting, but, from a policy perspective, may not be
useful because the target government already understands
that it is under attack from that source. The major chal-
lenge in forecasting transnational terrorism, as we see it,
is identifying sources of threat (countries who’s nation-
als conduct terrorist attacks against a given target state)
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before any attacks from that source have been observed
and quantifying the extent of the threat.
We approach the problem of forecasting transnational
terrorism from a network analytic perspective with the
supposition that the structure of the transnational terror-
ist network may be the best predictor of its own evolution.
We construct the global transnational terrorism network,
in which a directed edge exists from the state that pro-
duces a transnational terrorist to the state attacked by
that terrorist, using the ITERATE dataset [1]. The data
cover more than 12,000 transnational terrorist attacks
between 1968 and 2002. We create an edge forecasting
framework for the transnational terrorist network by inte-
grating a deterministic similarity-based edge prediction
method developed by Liben-Nowell and Kleinberg [2]
with a model-based probabilistic approach developed by
Hanneke, Fu, and Xing [3]. The result is a likelihood-based
forecastingmodel capable of quantifying the transnational
terrorist threat one state poses to another, even before
any attacks have occurred between the two states. Speciﬁ-
cally, we predict edges in the transnational terror network
by substituting the network structure embedded in the
recent patterns of transnational terrorism into the model
that best predicted the network up to time t − 1. Thus,
the predictive models for t are not based on the data
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from t. The result is a forecasting model that predicts
edges that occur in the next time period (year) with prob-
abilities orders of magnitude greater than those that do
not occur. As such, our model provides forecasts of the
locational dynamics of terrorist threats both before and
after the ﬁrst attacks have been realized. Our model lifts
a major limitation of traditional approaches to forecast-
ing transnational terrorist events and can provide early
warnings of emerging threats.
Background
Though transnational terrorism has been a highly visible
policy problem for the United States since the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001, transnational terrorism
is an older phenomena that, in many ways, came into
its heyday with skyjacking, hostage taking, and bombing
campaigns in the 1960’s and 1970’s. Quantitative research
on transnational terrorist violencea has focused largely
on two related themes: the predictors of terrorist vio-
lence and trend analysis of the violence itself. The ﬁrst
thread of literature, developed largely in the ﬁeld of politi-
cal science, has linked higher probabilities of transnational
terrorist violence to target states that have democratic
governments [4], politically left governments [5], more
veto-players in their governments [6], are perceived to
be more likely to grant concessions to terrorists [7], and
have further economic reach [8]. While this literature
does much to shed light on the factors that may make a
state more likely to suﬀer transnational terrorist attacks,
it does little to provide forecasts of terrorist violence with
any degree of precision. A second thread of literature
has focused on trends in transnational terrorist violence
itself. This literature, based at the intersection of politi-
cal science and economics, has established that terrorist
attacks exhibit cycling behavior [9], the number of terror-
ist attacks is decreasing but their lethality is increasing
[10], substantial increases in levels of violence are usually
unsustainable for the terrorist group [11], terrorist attacks
are persistent following shocks in states suﬀering from low
levels of terrorism (not for states suﬀering high levels of
terrorism) [12], and terrorists tend to substitute targets
when one type of target is hardened [13].
The literature that might help forecast terrorist events,
however, has a major limitation: existent ﬁndings are
either overly broad (i.e. democracies are more likely to be
attacked by terrorists) or rely on voluminous attack data
before trends can be identiﬁed and forecasts made. The
lack of speciﬁcity from most statistical models of terrorist
attacks is problematic from a policy perspective because,
while it may warn a government that it is at elevated risk
of terrorist attacks based on its attributes, it does little
to inform the government about the source or timing of
the threat. The trend analyses, while useful for predict-
ing the ebb and ﬂow of terrorist campaigns, are limited
by not being able to make accurate predictions about the
onset of hostilities. Furthermore, the literature onwhy dis-
contented groups resort to terrorism [14,15] is dedicated
more to explaining the onset of terrorist campaigns than
predicting such onset.
To date, the literature is moot in terms of statisti-
cal models designed not only to forecast attacks during
terrorist campaigns, but to forecast emerging terrorist
threats, and do so with a high degree of locational speci-
ﬁcity: predicting not only when but from which country
transnational terrorist attacks will emanate. Such a tool
would provide insight from an academic perspective and
prove useful from a policy perspective. It is with this aim
that we develop a hybrid methodology from both deter-
ministic and stochastic edge prediction techniques to pre-
dict the timing and locational dynamics of transnational
terrorism.
Data
The data for our study are drawn from the “Interna-
tional Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events” (ITER-
ATE) dataset [1]. These data are well suited to our aims
as they cover all transnational terrorist attacks over a 34
year period (1968–2002). The operational deﬁnition of
transnational terrorism used for data collection is “the use,
or threat of use, of anxiety-inducing, extra-normal vio-
lence for political purposes by any individual or group,
whether acting for or in opposition to established gov-
ernmental authority, when such action is intended to
inﬂuence the attitudes and behavior of a target group
wider than the immediate victims and when, through the
nationality or foreign ties of its perpetrators, its loca-
tion, the nature of its institutional or human victims, or
the mechanics of its resolution, its ramiﬁcations tran-
scend national boundaries.” ([1], p. 2) The ITERATE data
are one of the most comprehensive and commonly used
data sets on transnational terrorism (for example, see
[4,5,8,10-12,16]).
The ITERATE data, among other variables, codes the
known nationalities of the terrorists who participate in a
given transnational attack and the location of the attack.
From these variables, we create the network of transna-
tional terrorist attacks by year. We code a directed edge
as existing from country i to country j if a national of
country i participates in a terrorist attack on location
j; we call these terrorist edges. Note that many attacks,
such as the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United
States, are perpetrated by non-state actors (e.g., al-Qaeda).
In such instances, we code a directed edge from every
known nationality of the attackers involved in the attack
implementation to the target vertex. One may object that
transnational terrorists sometimes emigrate from their
homelands, developing doctrine, training, and establish-
ing support networks in states that are neither their home
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nor their target. However, when we consider the process
of radicalization, this is less concerning. When a terrorist
emigrates to develop their plans and capabilities, the pro-
cess of radicalization proceeded the emigration and, thus,
will typically take place in their home country. It is the
case that some of the better-known terrorist masterminds
spend substantial portions of their lives abroad, hopping
from place to place, but this is more typical of senior
group leadership and less typical of those who actually
execute the attacks. As such, many of the globe-hoppers
would not be included in the dataset anyway (if they did
not participate in an identiﬁable way in the attack). Sec-
ond, attempting to consider where a terrorist has spend
their “important years” would introduce substantial cod-
ing problems. For example, many of the 9/11 hijackers
received critical training (i.e. ﬂight training) in the United
States, but drawing a looping edge from the U.S. to the
U.S. makes little substantive sense. Furthermore, data on
where terrorists have spent their time prior to their attacks
is not generally available and is prone to error and uncer-
tainty; terrorists typically try to conceal their training
camps and hideouts. As it stands, no information is avail-
able in our dataset beyond the known nationalities of
attackers, and so we use that as a criteria for constructing
the network.
To construct the network, we must also deﬁne the uni-
verse of possible terrorist edges in a given year, which
requires a deﬁnition of membership in the international
system. We rely principally on the deﬁnition of the state
system provided by the Correlates of War Project, which
keeps a database of all countries that belong to the
international community in a given year.b We augment
membership in the international community by adding
a few non-state actors that have been either the source
or the target of transnational terrorism (e.g. Palestine
and the United Nations). Though such entities are not
technically countries, including them in the network is
preferable to excluding them because contested territo-
ries are important producers of transnational terrorism
and not including international governmental organiza-
tions would misclassify the target of the attack (i.e. where
it occurred rather than who was targeted).
All together, we produce a network with a median of
175 vertices over the time span that we study. A fea-
ture of these data that is somewhat atypical in network
analysis is that self-ties are present. It is common for ter-
rorists from state i to commit an attack in state i. While
we include these “loops” in our analysis, it is important
to point out that all of these loops are aﬃliated in some
way with a transnational terrorist incident. The ITER-
ATE data do not code domestic terrorist attacks and, as
such, loops represent acts in which a native of the tar-
get country collaborates with foreign terrorists to launch
an attack.
Two empirical features of this network are particularly
relevant to our forecasting approach: edge innovation and
transitivity. By edge “innovation,” we refer to terrorist
edges that did not exist in the previous time period or
periods. Substantively, edge innovation means that a ter-
rorist from country i attacked a target in country j, where
there had not been an attack from i to j for some time.
The number of new and recurrent edges in the network
over time is depicted in Figure 1. The shading indicates
the degree to which the current edges also occurred in
the past. What we see here is that, over the period 1980
– 2002, edges in the current network are just as likely
to be innovations in the network (i.e., those that have
not formed in the previous 10 years), as they are to be
recurrent edges from the previous year. The relatively low
degree of recurrence in the network implies that forecast-
ing based on the dynamics of edge stability/memory will
fail to capture a substantial portion of the year-to-year
activity in the network. We can also see the importance
of forecasting models designed to predict edge innova-
tions; traditional time-series approaches to forecasting
these innovations would prove fruitless.
The second feature we focus on, transitivity, is a mea-
sure of how important the network proximity of two ver-
tices is to the likelihood of terrorist edge forming between
those vertices (i.e., if the network is highly transitive, then
conﬁgurations in which a → b ∩ a → c ⇒ b → c
will be common). The foundational work on edge predic-
tion in networks uses measures of network proximity to
forecast future ties [2]. If transitivity is a persistent fea-
ture in a network, then proximity-based forecasts should
be relatively successful. However, if, in the terrorism net-
work, the neighbor of a neighbor is not a neighbor, then
another approach to link forecasting would be necessary.

















Figure 1 Number of country-country edges in the transnational
terrorism network by year. Shading indicates the number of edges
that are recurrent from previous years and how many are new edges,
or innovations in the network.
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Wemeasure the degree of transitivity in the transnational
terrorism network over time using a conditional uniform
graph (CUG) test. The CUG test for transitivity [17,18]
evaluates the observed degree of transitivity (the propor-
tion of potential transitive triads that are actually closed)
against a null distribution computed on a random sam-
ple of networks without transitivity. The null distribution
of networks places a uniform probability on the possible
networks, which have the same number of mutual and
asymmetric dyads as the observed networks (i.e., the null
distribution of networks is a uniform distribution condi-
tional upon having the same dyad census as the observed
network). The results of the CUG tests are depicted in
Figure 2. In 21 of the 23 years depicted, the observed value
of transitivity is larger than any of the 1,000 simulated null
values. This indicates that there is a substantial degree of
transitivity in the terrorism network. The exceptions are
1999 and 2001. It is not clear why the network would not
be noticeably transitive in this period. The lower over-
all density of the network may make it more diﬃcult to
identify this feature.
These two results, (1) that many edges represent inno-
vations with respect to the recent past and (2) the network
exhibits signiﬁcant transitivity, indicate that proximity-
based link prediction should be a fruitful exercise on the
transnational terrorism network. The persistence of inno-
vation means that any information that can be leveraged
about the indirect ties in the network will be quite valu-
able. The transitivity indicates that indirect ties will have
predictive power with respect to edge formation.
Why is transnational terrorism transitive?
It is not immediately intuitive why the network of transna-
tional terrorist attacks would exhibit the high degree of
transitivity we observe with the CUG test. Conﬂictual
international networks, such as international war [19],
exhibit substantial intransitivity; whereas transitivity is
commonly a feature of cooperative international networks
(e.g. military alliances) [20,21].
When approaching this question theoretically, it is use-
ful to distinguish between two common types of terrorist
groups by motivation: ethno-nationalist groups and reli-
gious/ideological groups. Ethno-nationalist groups have
speciﬁc goals of creating a state for their ethnic group or
liberating their nation from occupation (real or perceived)
and, as such, their attacks tend to be conﬁned to only one
target. Examples of such groups include the Provisional
Irish Republican Army (PIRA) and the Kurdistan Work-
ers’ Party (PKK). For ethno-nationalist groups, terrorist
violence is tied directly to the attainment of their nation-
alistic goals. Conversely, religious/ideological groups are
organized around a religious or political/ideological ideal
and tend to lack a clear policy objective.c However, such
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Figure 2 Conditional uniform graph tests for transitivity in the
transnational terrorism network. For each year, the histogram of
the null distribution of transitivity is depicted in gray, and the observed
value of transitivity is located at the red line. The null distribution is
constructed by measuring the transitivity of 1,000 networks simulated
from a uniform graph distribution conditional on the dyad census.
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and to attack targets in a number of countries. They
tend to target countries that exhibit religious/ideological
cultures that are counter to the groups’ ideals. Groups
such as al-Qaeda and the Red Army Faction fall into this
category.
We oﬀer two theoretical explanations for the transi-
tivity of the transnational terrorist network, the ﬁrst of
which applies more to religious/ideological groups than
to ethno-nationalist groups. These explanations are not
mutually exclusive and both may be occurring simulta-
neously. First, consider a religious/ideological terrorist
group X headquartered in state A. Suppose group X’s
ideology makes states B and C targets for attacks or cam-
paigns. Assuming the group has a support base in state
A, it is likely to recruit and train heavily there. During the
course of its campaigns against B and C, group X con-
tinues to recruit from A, but also recruits from B and C.
This pattern is both feasible and reasonably common for
religious/ideological groups whomay be headquartered in
one country, but whose support base spans several. After
some time, group X will have operational units in each of
the three countries. Early (and continued) recruiting in A
for attacks in B and C result in an out-2-star from A (i.e.,
two edges that form the start of a transitive triad). How-
ever, when recruits from B participate in attacks on C (or
recruits from C participating in attacks on B), a transitive
triad is formed. This process, through which ideologi-
cal/religious groups garner multinational support bases, is
illustrated in the left column of Figure 3.
A second situation that can give rise to transitiv-
ity in the network, for either ethno-nationalist or reli-
gious/ideological groups, is an environment with multiple
terrorist groups. For example, extreme right and extreme
left groups may be active in the same region and their
overlapping attacks may form transitive patters. This two-
group process is illustrated in the right column of Figure 3.
Furthermore, a multi-group region need not be populated
with groups of opposing ideals in order to form transi-
tive triads. Bapat [22] provides an explanation for why
inﬁghting between groups with a common opponent is
common, especially as peace processes progress. When a
target state makes a move towards peace with its attack-
ers, that move will usually involve active negotiations with
one or several groups. In order to get their desired conces-
sions, the negotiating group must moderate its behavior.
This, however, is often not welcome by other groups or
by radicals within the negotiating group. If the negotiating
group is successful, it will, at best, seize power away from
rival groups or, at worst, seize power away from rivals
while negotiating a settlement that is unacceptable to a
broad swath of rivals and radicals; either way, rival groups
have an incentive to resist the change and radicals within
the negotiating group have an incentive to form splin-
ter groups. Resisting groups have been known to launch
spoiler campaigns agains the target state (attacks designed
to provoke the target state and make peace less likely) or
launch attacks directly on the negotiating group. At the
same time, the negotiating group needs a monopoly on
terrorist violence in order to be a reliable negotiating part-
ner for the government, so it has an incentive to crack
down on dissidents and rivals.
Method
Our method of forecasting is based on a probabilistic
modeling framework, and incorporates proximity mea-
sures from a deterministic edge prediction method. For
the probabilistic base of our method, we use the temporal
exponential random graph modeling (TERGM) frame-
work developed by Hanneke, Fu, and Xing [3]. To deﬁne
the speciﬁc TERGMs, we incorporate vertex-similarity
measures drawn from Liben-Nowell and Kleinberg [2],
who originally used those measures in a deterministic
manner. We ﬁrst review the TERGM approach to mod-
eling networks, then we describe the vertex-similarity
measures and how we incorporate them into the TERGM
modeling framework.
The exponential random graph model (ERGM) [23,24]
is deﬁned by a ﬂexible discrete, exponential family joint
distribution for a network N. The likelihood function is




where θ ∈ Rp is the parameter vector, :N → Rp is a vec-
tor of statistics that are computed on the network, and the
summation in the denominator is a normalizing constant
computed on the support of N (denoted N ). This model
is ﬂexible in that  can be speciﬁed to capture virtually
any form of interdependence among the edges in the net-
works, as well as dependence of the edges on exogenous
features.
Hanneke, Fu, and Xing [3] extended the ERGM tomodel
a network observed at numerous discrete time points,
which extends the ﬁrst-order dependence of the original
model formulation [25]. This is accomplished mathemat-
ically by including past realizations of N in the  that
deﬁnes the ERG distribution for the current network. The
network is observed in T discrete time periods. Let Nt
be the observed network at time t. Temporal interde-
pendence of the networks can be built into the model
by conditioning Nt on K previous realizations of the
network.
The probability of observing Nt in the temporally inter-
dependent ERGM (TERGM) of order K is written as
P(Nt|K , θ) = exp{θ
′(Nt ,Nt−1, . . . ,Nt−K )}
C(θ ,Nt−K , . . . ,Nt−1) . (2)
Recall that the denominator in Equation 1 is a normal-
izing constant (i.e., a partition function). We update the
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Figure 3 Illustration of single- and two-group processes that result in transitivity in the transnational terrorism network. The left column
illustrates a single-group process that results in transitive closure. The right column illustrates a two-group process that also results in transitive
closure.
notation in 2 to reﬂect this property. The likelihood func-
tion is deﬁned as
∏T
t=K+1 P(Nt|K , θ).d In our implemen-
tation, a new θ is estimated for each t (i.e., θ t). We allow
parameters to vary by period due to temporal heterogene-
ity in the network structure, which is indicated by the
considerable decrease in the density of the network over
time and is visible in Figure 1.
In what can safely be called the foundational work on
edge prediction in complex networks, Liben-Nowell and
Kleinberg [2] capitalize the insight that vertices close or
similar to each other in a network are likely to link in the
future. They describe multiple measures of “proximity” in
a network. Each measure of proximity results in a score
δ(i, j) for each dyad of vertices ij in the network. These
scores are then computed on a training network deﬁned
over an interval of the past. Dyads are then ranked with
respect to these scores. For prediction, the potential new
edges are constrained to be thosemeeting a certain degree
threshold in the training network. The subset of dyads
deﬁned on this network are then ranked with respect to
their proximity scores and dyads that have high δ are
predicted to be edges in the next time interval. Each prox-
imity measure is evaluated with respect to its predictive
performance.
We build upon this work by integrating proximity mea-
sures into the  of the TERGM. In our approach, the
individual proximity measures are combined into a single
model using the estimated weights (θ ). A single best per-
forming proximity measure need not be selected, a feature
which provides considerable ﬂexibility in the proximity
terms to include. Also, the TERGM estimates permit us
to forecast the probability of edges in the future. Each
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If states i or j were not in the international system during
the period taken as the training network interval [ t0, t−1],
then we set δ(i, j)t0,t−1 = 0. Considering Figure 1, there
appears to be signiﬁcant dependence of the current net-
work on the network from t − 1 and that in [ t − 5, t − 2].
We therefore perform our analyses setting t0 at t − 1 and
t − 5.
We consider 7 measures of the proximity of vertices.
Figure 4 provides illustration of the sub-graph conﬁgura-
tions that constitute 4 of the proximity measures.
1. Flow. This measure generalizes preferential
attachment [2] to the directed case. Preferential
attachment is implemented as a measure of
proximity by Liben-Nowell [2] as δ(i, j) = kikj, where
k is the degree (i.e., the number of edges) of a given
vertex. To take advantage of the direction of the ties,
we conceive of a process whereby an attack from i to
j is likely if i sends many attacks and/or j receives
many attacks. In other words, we posit that frequent
attackers are close to regular targets in the network.
The measure of ﬂow is δ(i, j) = koi kij , where ko and ki
are the out and in-degrees respectively.
2. CTarget. The number of common targets shared by
two countries: δ(i, j) =∑h NihNjh.
3. CAttacker. The number of common attackers
shared by two countries: δ(i, j) =∑h NhiNhj
4. JacSim. The Jaccard similarity between two countries
is δ(i, j) =[CTarget + CAttacker]/[ ki + kj], which
normalizes the measure of common neighbors by
the total number of neighbors of the vertices in
the dyad.
5. AASim. The Adamic/Adar similarity adjusts the
measure of common neighbors for the rarity of the
neighbors to which the two countries tie. This
measure is deﬁned as
δ(i, j) =∑h [ln(kh)]−1 (NihNjh + NhiNji).
6. SameCom. Common community membership. We
partition the countries into communities using the
random walk modularity optimization algorithm
“Walktrap” [26] and create an indicator,
δ(i, j) = 1(ci == cj), of whether i and j are members
of the same community.
7. Distance. Lastly, we include the minimum path
length between i and j. We set δ(i, j) equal to the
number of countries in the network plus one if there
is no path from i to j.
In eachmodel we include a count of the number of edges
in the network to model the network’s density. In addi-
tion to the proximity measures, and following Hanneke,
Fu, and Xing [3], we include a memory term (PrevAttack)
to capture persistence in the ties between the training net-





ij +(1−Ntij)(1−Nt0,t−1ij ). We try
each statistic computed on the networks over the interval
[ t − 1, t − 1] and [ t − 5, t − 1]. In the interest of compar-
ing the performance of models on edges that did not occur
in the past 10 years, we start our analysis at 1980 and go
through the end of the dataset in 2002. Each model con-
tains the edges term and some subset, including the empty
set, of the memory and proximity terms, at both the one
and ﬁve year intervals. The memory term and each of the
proximity terms is (a) included computed on the one year
training interval, (b) included computed on the ﬁve year
training interval, and (c) excluded from the model. This
leads to a total of 38 = 6, 561 models estimated at each t
The forecast model for t is selected as the best perform-
ing model up to t− 1. Performance is judged based on the
predictive log score (i.e., the forecast log-likelihood) [27].
By using the predictive log score, in expectation, we use
the model with the minimum Kullback-Leibler divergence
from the actual model that generated the data [27].We use
θ t−1 to perform the forecast of Nt , which was estimated
to ﬁtNt−1 based onNt0−1,t−2. Thus, it is a true forecast in
that the TERGM used to predict Nt has only been trained
on the series of networks up to t − 1.
The forecasting algorithm we employ is summarized as:
1. Estimate each of the 6,561 forecasting models for
each time point from 1980 up to the previous year.
Denote the structural measures in model M as M .
Let θ tM be the parameters estimated on Nt using M .



















4. Draw many forecast networks from the distribution
in item 3 and compute the mean edge value in order
to estimate the probability of any particular edge.
We apply this algorithm to all 23 years of the transnational
terrorist network under consideration.
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Figure 4 Sub-graph conﬁgurations underlying predictivemeasures. (a) Flow, (b) Geodesic Distance, (c) Common Attacker, (d) Common Target.
Results
There are a number of questions to be asked of our
results. First, what is the overall performance of our
approach to forecasting transnational terrorism? Second,
does our approach oﬀer leverage in predicting innova-
tions in transnational terrorist relationships? Third, can
we see any patterns in the proximity and memory features
that predict transnational terrorism? We address these
questions in turn.
We begin by considering the overall performance of our
forecasting method. The overall predictive performance
is evaluated using the area under the receiver operating
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characteristic curve (AUC) [28]. The receiver operating
characteristic (ROC) curve gives the relationship between
the false positive and true positive rates in predicting the
value of a dichotomous outcome (e.g., the presence or
absence of an edge in a network). A perfect classiﬁer has
an AUC of 1 and the closer to 1 an AUC is, the better the
model is predicting. In Figure 5, we contrast the AUCs for
the one-year-ahead forecasts of the best-predicting speci-
ﬁcation and two speciﬁcations that include only memory
terms of 1 and 5 years respectively. Comparing to the “just
memory” models allows us to identify the contribution of
adding the indirect network proximity terms to the fore-
casting model. The proximity model with the highest log
score up to t − 1 performs much better than the mem-
ory models. The AUC is approximately 0.95 on average,
which compares to 0.83 and 0.72 for the ﬁve and one
year memory models respectively. The implication is that
future edges in the transnational terrorism network can be
forecast based on network proximity in the recent past.
Above, we make the claim that network proximity based
forecasting will allow us to leverage the considerable
transitivity in transnational terrorism and forecast edge
innovations: to predict a terrorist edge from one state to
another where no such edge existed within a given win-
dow of time. Here, we evaluate the performance of our
method on edges that did not occur in the recent past.
A straightforward way to evaluate the predictive perfor-
mance of our forecasting method is to consider the diﬀer-
ence between the probability of edge formation assigned
to those dyads that do form edges versus the probability
of edge formation among those that do not form edges.
Figure 6 shows forecasted probabilities assigned to edges
that experience attacks and those that do not experience
Figure 5 One-year-ahead forecast AUC for various models. To
compute the forecast AUC, we use the parameters estimated by
modeling Nt−1 based on Nt0−1,t−2 to forecast Nt based on Nt0,t−1. The
“Best” model is the one that has had the highest average predictive
log score up to t. “Memory 1” only has a memory eﬀect from the
previous year and an edges term. The “Memory 5” model only has a
memory eﬀect from the previous 5 years and an edges eﬀect.
Figure 6 Forecasted probabilities for edges that experience
attacks and those that do not experience attacks. Forecasted
probabilities for edges that experience attacks and those that do not
experience attacks. π¯ is the mean forecast probability in the
respective year. The probability of an attack from one location to
another in year t is computed with the TERGM estimates from the
model that, in terms of predictive log score, most accurately
predicted Nt−1 from Nt0−1,t−2. In the interest of clarity, the y-axis is
depicted on the log scale. Box plots depict the distribution of π
among those directed dyads that experienced an attack in t.
attacks (potential edges that are not realized). We con-
sider innovations of edges that have not occurred in the
previous 1, 5 and 10 years, respectively. The results are
similar for each of the three innovation intervals. The
model assigns consistently low probabilities (in the range
of 0.002) to potential edges that result in non-attacks.
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More importantly, the edges that do form are, on aver-
age, forecast to do so with one to two orders of magnitude
higher probability than are non-edges. The strong per-
formance of our forecasting model in predicting edge
innovations is a major contribution to the policy problem
of identifying and addressing threats from the myriad of
potential sources of transnational terrorism.
Lastly, we consider the contributions of the individual
proximity and memory measures to the ﬁt of the model.
Figure 7 displays the ratio of the mean one-year-ahead
forecast areas under the ROC curve with and without the
given measure. A value greater than unity indicates that
the average forecast AUC is higher when the respective
term is included in the model. The plots show results
from one (red) and ﬁve (blue) year memory models and all
results are shown over time. Those statistics that consis-
tently produce ratios greater than one can be said to make
consistent contributions to the predictive performance
of the model. Consistently highly performing measures
include PrevAttack, Flow, CAttacker and AASim. The
SameCom and Distancemeasures contribute substantial
predictive performance in some years, but their eﬀects are
more volatile. For all of the measures that consistently add
to the predictive performance of the model, the measure
is computed on the ﬁve year interval. The superior perfor-
mance of the measures computed with ﬁve year memories
reinforces the result from Figure 5 that the transnational
terrorism network exhibits long memory.
Case test: The Saudi link to the U.S. in 2001
The terror attacks of September 11, 2001 are the most
spectacular and terrible the world has yet seen. They
were also unexpected by policy and intelligence analysts.
Among the surprises of the 9/11 attacks was the fact that
15 of the 19 hijackers were Saudi; indeed, it was the ﬁrst
time a Saudi citizen had committed any sort of attack
on U.S. soil in almost three decades. As a test case, we
examine what information our forecastingmodel provides
about that 9/11 link from Saudi Arabia to the U.S.
To begin the case analysis, consider the ranked list,
reported in Table 1, of the ten most highly predicted
Table 1 Top ten predicted sources of terrorism against









8 Saudi Arabia 0.012
9 Egypt 0.011
10 Iran 0.011
The rank-ordered sources of transnational terrorist threat most highly predicted
by our forecasting model for the year 2001.
sources of attacks on the U.S. in 2001. Saudi Arabia is the
8th highest predicted source of attack and the list generally
suggests a high risk posed by Middle Eastern countries;
with Algeria, Pakistan, Iraq, Jordan, Egypt, and Iran also
making the top 10. Canada may seem like an odd coun-
try to make the top 10 threat list, but attacks on the US
from Canada have occurred, the most recent attack by a
Canadian citizen preceding 9/11 occurred in 1999. This
list, we believe, would be a useful guide for intelligence
analysts and law enforcement oﬃcials attempting to eﬃ-
ciently divide their counter-terrorism resources between
a larger number of possible threats.
The comparatively high probability assigned to attacks
by Saudi citizens bodes well for our model, but how does
the prediction for 2001 compare to other years and which
statistics in our model produce the prediction? Figure 8
shows the percentile rank of Saudi Arabian citizens among
those from all other countries in the world in a given year,
with respect to the predicted probability of an attack on
the U.S. We can see from the Figure that, at the time of the
9/11 attacks, the probability of attack on U.S. soil by Saudi
citizens was the highest it had ever been (and the second
Figure 7 Relative forecasting performance of models with andwithout respective eﬀects. Depicted is the ratio of the average one-year-ahead
forecast areas under the ROC curves with and without the particular term. Terms computed on the one (ﬁve) previous year(s) are in red (blue).
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Figure 8 Relative threat of an attack on the U.S. posed by Saudi
nationals. The y-axis gives the percentile rank of Saudi Arabia among
all other countries in the world at the time, with respect to the
predicted probability of an attack on the U.S. The red bar is placed at
2001, which is the one and only recorded instance of a Saudi
attacking on U.S. soil.
highest achieved during the timeframe of our dataset).
Interestingly, we also see that, based on the connectivity of
the network, the Saudi threat begins mounting seriously
in the late 1980’s; during this time, attackers from Saudi
Arabia strike in Israel. The drop noticed in 1992 occurs
because, for that year, Saudi Arabia has no outgoing edges
during the ﬁve year training period and the U.S. and Saudi
Arabia have no common attackers. We see the probabil-
ity of an attack jump back up again, elevate, and stay high
following 1992. During this time, Iran becomes a com-
mon attacker for the U.S. and Saudi Arabia and a surge of
international attacks by Saudi citizens begins: Saudis par-
ticipate in attacks in Egypt, Jordan, the Philippines, Kenya
and Tanzania, Pakistan, Uruguay, Albania, and Cambodia.
Note, while not edges to the U.S. territorially, and there-
fore not recorded as edges to the U.S. in our networks,
the 1998 Kenyan and Tanzanian attacks were orchestrated
by al-Qaida and targeted U.S. embassies in those coun-
tries. This is also the time during which Osama bin Laden
turned his resources against the U.S.; a response to his
outrage over U.S. military forces being allowed in Saudi
Arabia during the Gulf War.
We can see in Table 2, that ﬂow, common attacker,
and distance are producing the prediction for 2001, since
these statistics comprised the model that best predicted
the network in 2000. Flow and distance are both intu-
itive. Flow captures the fact that simultaneously Saudi
Arabia is a (increasingly) large sender of attacks and the
U.S. is (increasingly) a large receiver of attacks. Distance
simply indicates that the geodesic distance between the
U.S. and Saudi Arabia is large. The common attacker
tie, as recorded in the ITERATE data, is a bit less intu-
itive, because the states are tied by Canada. This is not
as odd as it might initially seem and actually reinforces
our theoretical query into the transitivity of the network:
Table 2 Predictive model for 2001
δ t0 θ δ%tile∗
PrevAttack 1996 1.64 0
Flow 1996 0.027 99.99
CAttacker 1996 0.24 98.46
AASim 2000 0.5 0
SameComm 2000 0.441 0
Distance 1996 4.07 98.89
∗δ %tile is the Percentile rank of δ(SA,US). The model used to predict the
network in 2001. This is the model that best predicted the network in 2000
based on the θ estimated on the 1999 network. The θ in this table were
estimated on the 2000 network. The percentile rank is based on a comparison
with all of the other predictive scores (i.e., δ) of the other directed pairs of
countries for which 2001 predictive scores are computed. The t0 denote the
beginning of the interval on which the predicting network is deﬁned for that
statistic, with all predictive network intervals ending in 2000.
Islamic extremists, and bin Laden in particular, were tak-
ing advantage of geographic proximity and soft borders
by using Canada as a base for attacks on the U.S. [29].
In the meantime, a Canadian citizen was recruited by bin
Laden, and participated in an attack onwesterners (British
and Irish) in Saudi Arabia [30]. This activity in Canada
also explains the fact that Canada appears on our 2001
top-threat list for the U.S.
Conclusion
Our study of the transnational terrorist network makes at
least three major contributions. First, we contribute to the
literature on edge forecasting in complex networks. We
integrate deterministic proximity-based forecasting into
the probabilistic TERGM modeling of the evolution of a
network based on its own topography. This approach can
be applied to the edge prediction problem in many areas.
This general method may prove useful for predicting the
occurrence of edges in any variety of other networks such
as international conﬂict (war), scientiﬁc collaboration and
friendship.
We contributed to the state of knowledge about transna-
tional terrorism by identifying that (1) there is an even
mix of memory and innovation in the transnational ter-
rorism network and (2) the network exhibits substantial
transitivity. The transitivity we observe is likely due to
to economic, political, linguistic, and religious clustering
that are subsumed under country labels. In other words,
the way in which we deﬁne the vertices in the networks
acts as a catch-all for the features likely to drive terrorism.
Future research should address what speciﬁc features of
countries predict terrorist link formation.
Lastly, but perhaps most importantly, we have advanced
terrorism forecasting models in two critical directions.
Our approach provides the necessary source-target speci-
ﬁcity required to be useful for protecting the target and
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addressing the source. Second, by leveraging the infor-
mation on indirect ties in the network, our method is
able to predict the occurrence of new terrorist edges.
The ability to predict edge innovation is critical from a
policy perspective because early warning is essential for
the allocation of security resources that can, potentially,
save lives.
Endnotes
aIt is worth noting that there is a deep literature on
psychological traits that make an individual more likely
to become a terrorist and on the psychological group
dynamics that aﬀect a group’s cohesion, but we do not
consider this literature extensively here because its focus
relates to individual behaviors rather than the amount of
violence states suﬀer at the hands of terrorists. See [14,31]
for reviews of this literature.
bThese data are freely available at http://www.
correlatesofwar.org/.
cThey tend to at least lack realistic policy objectives,
though they may have stated objectives such as the impo-
sition of global Islamic law or communism.
dNote that the computation of the likelihood requires
the omission of the ﬁrst K networks. Hanneke, Fu, and
Xing [3] point out that one could also specify a sep-
arate probability model for these networks, but it is
unclear what beneﬁt would come of such an exercise,
since this convenience model would, by construction, be
misspeciﬁed.
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